Clinical reasoning refers to the cognitive processes or thinking used in the evalua Pbys Ther 1992; 72:875-884.] 
There is an increasing demand for accountability of physical therapists from within the profession as well as outside, including funding agencies, competing health practitioners, and the increasingly more health conscious consumer. This demand is met in part by the profession's ongoing efforts to teach and conduct scientific inquiry with the aim of improving and validating physical therapy practice. Equally important, physical therapists must apply the methods of scientific inquiry to the examination and management of patient problems. Accountability suffers when therapists unquestioningly follow examination and treatment routines without considering and exploring alternatives. Scientific reasoning often includes the hypothetico-deductive method, in which hypotheses are generated from observations and the hypotheses are then tested through subsequent data collection and modified as a result of the outcome of the test. Similarly, physical therapists should be taught to use clinical reasoning skills in their examination and management of patients. But what reasoning skills should we teach? And how should this be balanced against the teaching of knowledge? Understanding the cognitive components of clinical reasoning and in particular the differentiating features between experts and novices should enable us to critically evaluate our own reasoning and design educational activities to facilitate improved reasoning. 
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are increasing,'-5 research in clinical reasoning within physical therapy is still sparse.-Considerable research, however, has been conducted in the area of thinkingkeasoning and the nature of expertise in such diverse fields as medicine, nursing, psychology, artificial intelligence, programming, law, mathematics, engineering, and physics.S13 This article will briefly highlight research findings that provide insight into the growing understanding of clinical reasoning and the nature of expertise relevant to physical therapy. Although further research is needed to clarify the nature of clinical reasoning, the majority of clinical reasoning literature suggests that expert clinicians have a highly developed organization of knowledge and use a hypotheticodeductive method in their clinical reasoning.14 A model of a clinical reasoning process for physical therapists is presented that emphasizes a hypothesis testing approach to clinical reasoning. Clinical reasoning that is hypothetico-deductive will assist clinicians in avoiding common errors of reasoning and enhance their recognition of clinical patterns and organization of knowledge.
Cllnkal Reasonlng
Clinical reasoning can be defined as the cognitive processes, or thinking used in the evaluation and management of a patient. Other terms including "clinical decision making,"l "clinical problem solving,"8 and "clinical judgrnent"l0 also appear in the literature and frequently are used interchangeably. Clinical decision making and clinical judgment focus on the diagnostic decision-making aspect of the clinical reasoning process, whereas problem solving typically refers to the steps involved in working toward a problem solution. Problem solving also infers the therapist's aim is to solve the patient's problem. Some patient problems, however, are "unsolvable." Our profession's aim is to evaluate the patient problem, identifylng factors amenable to physical therapy to effectively manage the problem. The term "clinical reasoning" has broader connotations and is used in this article to refer to the cognitive processes used in achieving this aim of evaluating and managing the patient's problem.
Cllnlcal Reasonlng In Medlclne: A Unhrersal Process
A summary of findings from early medical education research in clinical reasoning highlights some universal aspects of clinical reasoning and the significance that the organization of one's knowledge has to the differentiation of expert clinicians and novices. Early medical education studies analyzed clinicians' thoughts (eg, percep tions, interpretations, plans), either retrospectively as the clinicians thought aloud while being prompted by a video or audio playback of a patient examination just completed or concurrently as the clinicians read a patient's unfolding clinical history.
In a review of research in medical clinical reasoning, Feltovich and Barrows15 described hypotheses and data gathering that were considered in the clinical reasoning studies. The variables affecting hypothesis generation included the percentage of patient data items or the time it took to creation of the first hypothesis. The total number of hypotheses considered and number of hypotheses actively considered at any one time were also studied. There was no difference in any of these variables across different specialties or across different levels of experience within the same specialty. Although these hypothesis-related variables are common to all clinicians, their importance to effective clinical reasoning was unclear, as none were consistently predictive of the quality of outcome (eg, correct diagnosis and management plan).
The data-gathering variables centered on the general themes of thoroughness, efficiency (ie, important to nonimportant information collected), activeness (ie, extent to which data collected are evaluated in relationship to hypotheses being considered to test appropriateness of hypotheses), and accuracy in interpretation (ie, correctness of interpretations as supporting or not to hypotheses). The value of the data-gathering measures to reveal important aspects of clinical reasoning were also questionable, as they did not discriminate among clinicians from different specialties or clinicians with different levels of experience or peer-judged proficiency. The importance of these datagathering variables to the products of the rea5oning process was also questioned. With the exception of "accuracy in interpretation,"16 no other datagathering variable correlated with quality of diagnosis and management plan.
The best indicator of the correctness of diagnosis and management plan was the quality (as judged by expert standards) of hypotheses considered. [17] [18] [19] [20] If the appropriate hypotheses were not considered from the start, the clinician's subsequent inquiries would presumably be misdirected. This finding of the importance of good hypotheses highlights the crucial role the clinician's knowledge base has in the clinical reasoning process. The importance of knowledge and its organization are also reflected in the seminal work of Elstein and colleagues,16 in which clinical reasoning performance was shown to vary greatly across cases. That is, clinical reasoning is specific to one's area of work (eg, orthopedics, neurology, and so forth), dependent on the clinician's organization of knowledge in the particular area.
These early medical studies provide an overall picture of a clinical reason-, ing process that is hypotheticodeductive and universally applied by clinicians at all levels of experience. The process involves collecting and analyzing information, generating hypotheses concerning the cause or nature of the patient's condition, investigating or testing these hypotheses through further data collection, and determining the optimal diagnostic and treatment decisions based on the data obtained.
The Nature of Expertise
"Experts" in the early medical education research were typically those selected by peer nomination, whereas "novices" were usually students at varying levels of their education.lb20 Pate1 and Groen21 have suggested that expertise be considered along the dual continuum of both generic and specialized knowledge. They define a novice as an individual who has the prerequisite knowledge assumed by the domain. A subexpert, according to Pate1 and Groen,  25 The depth and organization of knowledge between novices and experts has consistently been found to differ.
Chess experts recognize patterns reflecting areas of strategic strength and vulnerability and positions supporting maneuvers of attack and defense. Although the chess expert can replicate a chessboard when viewed for only 5 seconds, there is a dramatic drop-off in this ability below the level of chess master. N o differences, however, are found when the chess pieces are randomly arranged, demonstrating the chess master's superior ability to perceive patterns in chess positi0ns.26.~7 Expert physics problem solvers represent problems as instances of major laws of physics applicable to the specific situation in which novices' problem representation are more literal, fragmented, and tied to overt features of the problem such as the use of a spring or a pulley. 25 Similar results demonstrating experts' recognition of patterns have been replicated in several other domains such as in the game of GO, in reading circuit diagrams, in reading architectural plans, and in interpreting radiographs.z8 This superior ability to see meaningful patterns is not the result of superior perceptual or memory skills; rather it reflects a more highly organized knowledge base.2"
These representations of the problem will in turn influence the subsequent search for a solution. The expert chess player's conceptualization of the game into strengths and vulnerabilities lessens the number of appropriate moves to consider. When the physicist characterizes a problem as an example of a physics law, the law itself substantially directs the form and application of equations that will be used. Similarly, the physical therapist's representation of the problem (as determined by each individual's personal perspective and organization of knowledge) will influence the subsequent reasoning and search for a solution. For example, physical therapists who adhere to the concept of "adverse neural tissue tension" as described by Elvey29 and Butler 30 will conceptually approach the examination and treatment of a patient differently than therapists without this particular organization of knowledge. Recognition of the continuity of the nervous system29,30 will influence therapists' attention and weighting of patient clues and their subsequent search for supporting and negating data.
Using a method of propositional analysis to determine a clinician's mental representation of a case, Pate1 and colleagues31-3' have found analogous results when comparing medical clinicians at various levels of expertise. Typically, subjects are presented with a written patient description and then asked to recall the facts in writing, followed by their explanation of the patient's underlying pathophysiology and lastly their diagnosis. Propositional analysis is a system of noting and classifying the clinician's observations, findings, interpretations, and inferences derived from the infomation contained in the text. These studies consistently demonstrated differences between experts' and novices' conceptualization of a problem, with experts possessing a superior organization of knowledge. Experts make significantly more inferences about clinically relevant information and chunk information into recognizable patterns.32 Novices make more verbatim recall of the surface features of a problem and have less developed and fewer variations of patterns stored in their memory. For example, a novice may recall the specific, yet superficial, detail that the patient's shoulder hurt with attempted elevation in early activities. Further details such as the exact site of pain and position of the patient's neck, shoulder, and arm may not have been sought or attended to if the clinical patterns implicated by this additional information were not known to the student. The novice must rely on black and white textbook patterns and lacks information on the relationships and shared features across dfierent clinical patterns.3" This creates difficulty for the novice when confronted with irrelevant and unrelated information or patient presentations containing overlapping problems and gray, nontextbook variations.
An example of the novice's risk of missing overlapping problems is the patient whose lateral elbow pain is aggravated by resisted extension of the wrist. The novice may recognize this typical feature of injury to the common extensor origin yet fail to exclude (through inquiry and physical tests) other potentially coexisting disorders that may share or predispose to this clinical presentation (eg, involvement of C5-6 musculoskeletal structures, adverse neural tissue tension, radiohumeral joint and local radial nerve entrapment).
Bordage and colleagues39~4~ have demonstrated other more qualitative differences in the organization of novice and expert knowledge. Whereas the novice's knowledge is centered purely on disjointed lists of signs and symptoms, the stronger diagnosticians make use of abstract relationships such as proximal-distal, deep-superficial, and gradual-sudden, which assist to categorize similar and opposing bits of information in memory.
One's organization of knowledge not only appears to determine what labels are given to recognizable patterns of information, but also includes "production rules," which specify what actions should be taken in different situations.23~32.41 Experts are thought to have a large number of such rules specific to their area of experience.
The end result of the expert's superior organization of knowledge is the ability to reason inductively in a forward manner from the information presented and to achieve superior diagnostic accuracy. That is, when confronting a familiar presentation, experts can utilize rules of action found reliable in their own clinical experience to reach a diagnosis based on pure pattern recognition. When faced with an atypical problem or a problem out of their area of expertise, however, experts, like novices, must rely more on the hypotheticodeductive (ie, hypothesis testing) method of reasoning.22.42~~3
The organization of knowledge relevant to clinical manual therapy would include the facts (eg, anatomy, pathophysiology, and so forth), procedures (eg, examination and treatment strategies), concepts (eg, instability, adverse neural tissue tension), and patterns of presentation. This knowledge is utilized with the assistance of rules or principles (eg, selection of the grade of passive movement and technique) to acquire, interpret, infer, and collate patient information.
Clinlcal Reasoning in Physkal Therapy
Whereas research in medical education has emphasized diagnosis, I believe that physical therapists must be concerned with additional categories of hypotheses in order to deliver physical therapy effectively and safely. Therapists with different training will ask different questions and perform different tests in accordance with the significance they give to the subjective and physical information available from the patient. I propose, however, that despite these differences, the aims of therapists' inquiries are similar. That is, in an attempt to understand and manage the patient's problem, I contend that therapists obtain information regarding the following five categories of hypotheses: (1) source of the symptoms or dysfunction, (2) contributing factors, (3) precautions and contraindications to physical examination and treatment, (4) management, and (5) prognosis.
These hypothesis categories are not peculiar to any particular approach or philosophy of manual therapy. Any clinician who uses hypotheticodeductive clinical reasoning should be considering hypotheses within each of these categories.
"Source of the symptoms or dysfunction" refers to the actual structure from which symptoms are emanating. "Contributing factors" are any predisposing or associated factors involved in the development or maintenance of the patient's problem, whether environmental, behavioral, emotional, physical, or biomechanical. For example, a subacromial structure may be the source of the symptoms, whereas poor force production by the scapular rotators may be the contributing factor responsible for the development or maintenance of an "impingement" syndrome.
Hypotheses regarding "precautions and contraindications to physical examination and treatment" serve to determine the extent of physical examination (ie, whether specific movements are performed or taken up to or into ranges of movement in which pain is provoked and how many movements are tested), whether physical treatment is indicated, and, if so, whether there are constraints to physical treatment (eg, the use of passive movement without provoking any discomfort versus passive movement that provokes the patient's pain). Rothstein and Echternachj~~~ have proposed a useful hypothesis-oriented algorithm for clinicians. In highlighting the all-too-frequent occurrence of clinicians carrying out routine treatment plans that are unrelated to the preceding patient examination, these authors make a case for the need for physical therapists to acquire clinical reasoning skills. They provide a clear set of steps that appropriately highlight the importance of utilizing data from the patient interview to generate a problem statement and establish measurable goals. The algorithm continues with the physical examination and the generation of hypotheses about the cause(s) of the patient's problem. They note that testing criteria for each hypothesis should be considered and that all treatments should relate to the hypotheses made. I have adapted a diagram from Barrows and Tamblyn48 to depict the clinical reasoning process of physical therapists (Figure) . This is not a substitute for the hypothesis-oriented algorithm of Rothstein and Echternach.3.47 Rather, this model is presented to bring attention to the hypothesis generation, testing, and modification that I feel should take place through all aspects of the patient encounter including the interview, physical examination, and ongoing management. I have also attempted to depict the cyclical character of the clinical reasoning process and to highlight key factors that influence the various phases of clinical reasoning. The process begins with the therapist's obsavation and interpretation of initial cues from the patient. Even in the opening moments of greeting a patient, the therapist will observe specific cues such as the patient's age, appearance, facial expressions, movement patterns, resting posture, and any spontaneous comments. These initial cues from the patient should cause the therapist to develop an iniiial concept of the problem that includes prelimina y working hypotheses for consideration through the rest of the examination and throughout ongoing management of the patient. For example, if the patient shows obvious difficulty in removing his or her arm from a jacket, the therapist will already be forming initial hypotheses or working interpretations regarding the source of the problem and degree of involvement. Further information (ie, data collection) is then sought throughout the subjective and physical examination with these working hypotheses in mind.
Although certain categories of information (eg, site, behavior, and history of symptoms) are scanned in all patients, the specific questions pursued are tailored to each patient and the therapist's evolving hypotheses. For example, when the patient with d f iculty removing the jacket describes an area of ache in the supraspinous fossa and an area of pain in the anterior shoulder just lateral to the coracoid process, the initial hypothesis of a "shoulder problem" is already modified. Similarly, the physical examination is not simply a routine series of tests. There may be specific physical tests that are used for different areas, but these should be seen as an extension of the data collection and hypothesis testing performed through the subjective e~amination.~~ For example, reports of painful "clicking" in the shoulder and sensations of apprehension indicate the need for instability and labral integrity testing, but these tests may not be warranted in the next patient who has similar symptoms.
This process of data collection continues as hypotheses are refined and reranked and new ones considered in the therapist's "evolving concept" of the problem. The clinical reasoning through the patient examination continues until sufficient idormation is obtained to make a "diagnostic" and management decbion.
The clinical reasoning process does not stop at completion of the patient examination. Rather, the therapist will have reached the management decisions of whether to treat or not treat; whether to address the source(s) or contributing factor@), or both, initially; which mode of treatment to use initially; and, if passive movement treatment is to be used, whether to provoke symptoms and the direction and grade of movement. Every treatment, whether it is hands-on or advice, should be a form of hypothesis testing. Continual reassessment is essential and provides the evidence on which hypotheses are accepted or rejected. Reassessmmt should contribute to the therapist's evolving concept of the patient's problem. When treatment has not had the expected effect, the therapist's concept of the problem and its management may be altered, leading to a change in treatment or further inquiry (eg, reexamination, additional examination, reanalysis of data obtained, referral to another health care practitioner).
Factors lnfluenclng Cllnlcal Reasonlng
The clinical reasoning process is influenced by the therapist's knowledge base, cognitive skills (eg, data analysis and ~ynthesis),~6~*~~5~ and metacognitive skills (ie, awareness and monitoring of thinking processes 
Errors of Clinlcal Reasonlng
Successful management of a patient's problem requires a multitude of skills. Working from the patient's account of the problem, the therapist must be able to efficiently observe and extract information, distinguish relevant from irrelevant information, make correct interpretations, weigh and collate information, and draw correct inferences and deductions. Errors of reasoning may occur at any stage of the clinical reasoning process including errors of perception, inquiry, interpretation, synthesis, planning, and reflection. Application of hypothesis-oriented clinical reasoning as encouraged by the clinical reasoning model portrayed in the Figure  and the hypothesis-oriented algorithm described by Rothstein and Echternach4' should assist clinicians in avoiding errors of reasoning.
Examples of reasoning errors extrapolated from Nickerson et alsl are given below with the physical therapy applications derived by this author.
Adding pragmatic inferences.
Making assumptions is an error of reasoning. For example, a patient with pain in the supraspinous fossa will often describe this as "pain in my shoulder." It is a misrepresentation of the facts to assume the patient's "shoulder pain" is actually within the shoulder itself without specific clarification of the site.
Considering too fa0 hypotheses.
By prematurely limiting the hypotheses considered, discovery of the correct hypothesis may be missed or delayed. This can occur when inquiries and physical tests are only directed to the local sources of a patient's symptoms, as with the patient reporting "shoulder pain with any lifting." To interpret this automatically as a shoulder problem or, worse yet, a "frozen shoulder" without considering other hypotheses is an error of reasoning.
Failure to sample enough irzformution.
It is an error to make a generalization based o n limited data. This is seen in judgments regarding the success or failure of a particular management approach based on only a few experiences. Closely linked to this error is the failure to sample information in an unbiased way. Although this is typically controlled for in formal research, the practicing therapist will rely on memory of previous experiences as the sample on which views are based. The error occurs when only those cases are recalled that support one view while confounding evidence is forgotten.
Confirmution bias.
Another error of reasoning related to a biased sample of information occurs when therapists only attend to those features that support their favorite hypotheses while neglecting the negating features. This can lead to incorrect clinical decisions and hinder the therapist's opportunity to learn different variations of clinical patterns. For example, a presentation of central low back pain aggravated by slouched sitting may be quickly interpreted by some therapists to be a "diskogenic" disorder. Further clarification that the patient's pain provocation was not time dependent and that movement from a sitting to a standing position was not hindered, regardless of the speed at which it was performed, could represent negating features to the "diskogenic" diagnosis. Attention to such variations in presentation will assist therapists' recognition of clinical variations within the same diagnosis, which in turn should lead to recognition of optimal treatment strategies for the respective presentations.
E m r s in detecting covariance.
To make a judgment about the relationship of two factors requires understanding of how the two factors covary with one another. It is an error to make this judgment based solely on one combination of covariance. For example, knowing that the patient's medial scapular pain is experienced at the same time as a central neck pain is insufficient to judge the relationship of these symptoms. A full understanding of the relationship between these two symptoms requires inquiry of when both occur together, when the neck pain occurs without the scapular pain, when the scapular pain occurs without the neck pain, and when neither neck nor scapular pain are occurring.
6. Confusing covariance with causality. When Bordage and c o l l e a g~e s~~, 5~5~ suggest that most diagnostic errors are not the result of inadequate medical knowledge as much as an inability to retrieve relevant knowledge already stored in memory. That is, the Physical Therapy /Volume 72, Number amount of knowledge appears less relevant than the organization of that knowledge. When knowledge is not organized in clinically relevant patterns, it becomes less accessible in the clinical setting.
Having given the impression that good clinical reasoning will assist therapists in recognizing clinical patterns, a word of caution regarding excessive attention to clinical patterns is needed. Clinical patterns are at risk of becoming rigidly established when the patterns themselves control our attention. I believe this leads to errors of limited hypotheses and insufficient sampling where anything that has any resemblance to a standard pattern will be seen as that pattern. For example, the information that a patient has pain in the area of the greater trochanter aggravated by functional movements involving flexion or adduction of the hip may cause some therapists to hypothesize the existence of a "hip joint" disorder. Limiting one's hypotheses to what may appear to be the most obvious hypothesis without pursuing additional supporting or negating evidence prevents the therapist from ever learning the pattern of other disorders that may share features with a disorder of the hip (eg, lumbar spine, sacroiliac joint, adverse neural tissue tension) or the full range of presentations a hip joint disorder can manifest.
I

Implkatlons for Physkal Therapists
Physlcal Therapy Research in Cllnlcal Reasoning
Consideration of the clinical reasoning literature outside of physical therapy assists in developing an understanding of this topic while providing educational and clinical extrapolations to our profession. Debate continues in the medical literature, however, regarding the nature of expertise and the appropriate methodology to use in research.4015-3 Although some evidence does exist suggesting that medical and physical therapy clinical reasoning processes are similar,-the potential differences in medical and physical therapy organization of knowledge necessitates further investigation of potential differences in clinical reasoning and associated factors.
Facllltating Cllnlcal Reasoning in Our Students
As physical therapists have taken greater responsibility in patient management, especially with the increased autonomy associated with first-contact practice, physical therapy education ha. respbnded with efforts to produce more "thinking" therapists. Although attention to clinical reasoning skills has presumably always been inherent in our physical therapy education, there has been a more recent interest in providing more formal and focused learning experiences specifically aimed at facilitating clinical reasoning in physical therapy students.*.5aGS69
Facilitating students' clinical reasoning requires making them aware of their own reasoning process and designing learning experiences that promote all aspects of the clinical reasoning process while exposing the errors in reasoning that occur. This requires access to students' thoughts and feedback on thinking processes. That is, students should be taught to think and to think about their thinking.70 This can be achieved by promoting students' use of reflection to encourage awareness and promote integration of existing versus new knowledge. When combined with a better awareness of one's own cognitive processes (ie, metacognition), the students' processing of information is enhanced and clinical reasoning is facilitated. Learning experiences to facilitate clinical reasoning using both reflection and metacognition are described else~here.5~71
The process of reasoning should not, in my view, be addressed to the neglect of knowledge. Rather, facilitating the clinical reasoning process will assist the students' acquisition of knowledge. In turn, good organization of knowledge leads to better clinical reasoning. The importance of one's organization of knowledge is closely linked to the accessibility of one's knowledge. Knowledge that is acquired in the context for which it will be used becomes more accessible.72,73 Although clinical knowledge is typically presented in the context of patient problems, this is less commonly the case with the basic sciences (eg, pathophysiology). Approaches to physical therapy education in which the acquisition of knowledge is facilitated by teaching centered on patient problems pro- Learning the hypothesis testing approach also enables students to continue to learn beyond their formal education. Rather than relying on a text or more experienced colleague to learn new clinical patterns, the therapist who actively reasons through and reflects on patient problems will continually challenge existing patterns and in the process acquire new ones.
Summary
Early research in medical education provided a picture of a clinical reasoning process that was hypotheticodeductive and universally applied by clinicians at all levels of experience.
The differentiating feature of expert diagnosticians and novices appears to lie in their organization of knowledge. Experts have a superior organization of knowledge that enables them to reason inductively in a form of pattern recognition. When confronted with unfamiliar problems, the expert, like the novice, will rely on the more basic hypothesis testing approach to clinical reasoning.
Research to better understand the clinical reasoning and nature of expertise in physical therapy can assist us in designing learning experiences to facilitate clinical reasoning. Clinical reasoning is now being given specific attention in some physical therapy education programs. The aims of these programs should be to increase students' awareness of their clinical Physical Therapy ,/Volume 72, Number 12December 1992 reasoning and to foster development of both reasoning and knowledge through learning experiences centered on patient problems. This requires accessing students' thoughts during and after a patient encounter and providing feedback on errors of reasoning that emerge. Teaching students skills of reflection and metacognition should improve their clinical reasoning now and equip them with the: means to continue learning from future patient problems. Therapists can improve their own clinical reasoning by stopping at various points through a patient examination and the ongoing management period to consciously reflect on hypotheses being considered, implications of those hypotheses, and, in hindsight, where e:rrors of reasoning occurred. Clinical reasoning that is hypothesis directed and open-minded can add to our organization of knowledge and enhance the quality and accountability of our patient care.
